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1of the ones obtained with either endogenous time-dependent rules (Bonomo and
Carvalho, 2003) or imperfect credibility (Ball, 1995) in isolation. This results in
higher output costs of monetary disin￿ation.
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21I n t r o d u c t i o n
It is largely believed that nominal rigidities are important to understand the business
cycle, and, in particular, why it is so costly to disin￿ate. Most papers concerned with
those issues choose either deterministic (Taylor, 1979, 1980) or stochastic (Calvo, 1983)
time-dependent pricing rules (e.g. Ball, 1994, 1995 use Taylor-type; Yun, 1996, Clarida,
Gali and Gertler, 1999 and Woodford, 2003 use Calvo-type)1. Nonetheless, a common
feature of the vast majority of these models is the use of invariant price setting rules2.I n
particular, the contract length in Taylor-type models and the average frequency of price
adjustments in Calvo-type models are not responsive to changes in the economic envi-
ronment. This way of proceeding is clearly inappropriate when there are transformations
i nt h ee n v i r o n m e n t ,a si ti st h ec a s ew h e np o l i c yr u l e sa r ec h a n g e d 3. When monetary
authorities launch a disin￿ationary program they usually claim that the monetary rule
1More recently, some papers which use variations of time-dependent rules are Calvo, Celasun and
Kumhof (2003), who assume that ￿rms choose (linear) price paths rather than levels and Mankiw and
Reis (2002), who postulate Calvo-style randomization with respect to the arrival of information, rather
than the opportunity to adjust prices.
2One exception is Kiley (2000), who follows Romer (1990) in endogeneizing the frequency of price
adjustment in Calvo-type rules to study the business cycle. However, these two papers do not address
the issue of optimality of such rules.
3Ireland (1997), motivated by this shortcoming of exogenous time-dependent rules, uses Ball and
Mankiw￿s (1994) partially state-dependent rules to study how disin￿ation costs are related to the initial
in￿ation rate.
3will be modi￿ed.
Recently, Bonomo and Carvalho (2003) studied perfectly credible monetary disin￿a-
tions in an economy where price setters use endogenous time-dependent rules. In order
to make time-dependent rules optimal, they assume that adjustment and information
costs cannot be dissociated4. They develop a methodology for aggregating pricing rules
out of steady-state in order to evaluate aggregate output eﬀects of monetary disin￿ation.
The outcome is that endogeneity of time-dependent rules increases moderately the output
costs of disin￿ation.
In this paper we examine the output eﬀects of monetary disin￿ation under imperfect
credibility in a model in which ￿rms follow endogenous time-dependent rules. Credibility
has both a direct and an indirect eﬀect on prices. The direct eﬀect is through the ex-
pectation of the optimal price during a given contract length. Ball (1995) showed, in a
model with exogenous time-dependent rules, that because of this direct eﬀect, the costs of
disin￿ation increase when imperfect credibility and staggered price-setting are combined.
The indirect eﬀect arises in our model with endogenous rules because the change in con-
tract length also aﬀects the price chosen. With abrupt changes in the environment, as
it happens with the announcement of a new disin￿ation policy, this eﬀect is not second
order.
Endogeneity of time-dependent rules increases the costs of imperfectly credible disin-
4Conlon and Liu (1997) also assume that paying one lump-sum cost allows a ￿rm to change both its
price and product mix.
4￿ation under two metrics. First, it increases the recession when the stabilization is never
abandoned. Second, it increases the average costs of disin￿ation, evaluated by averaging
each possible path generated by a given abandonment time according to its likelihood.
The intuition underlying the result is simple. Under imperfect credibility, individual prices
are set at higher levels (when compared to the full credibility case) because there is some
probability that the stabilization will be abandoned before the next adjustment. With
endogenous rules, the increase in contract length, which takes place while the stabilization
is maintained, raises the probability of abandonment before the next adjustment, rein-
forcing this eﬀect. We ￿nd that these features interact to generate an additional eﬀect
on top of the ones obtained with either endogenous time-dependent rules (Bonomo and
Carvalho, 2003) or imperfect credibility (Ball, 1995) in isolation.
Almeida and Bonomo (2002) use endogenous state-dependent rules to examine output
costs of monetary disin￿ation. In contrast with our results, they found that disin￿ation
costs are smaller when computed with endogenous rules. This con￿rms the insight pro-
vided by Caplin and Spulber￿s (1987) neutrality result that the type of nominal rigidity
matters, even for qualitative results. They also treat brie￿y the case of imperfect credi-
bility. In the context of state-dependent rules, credibility simply aﬀects the magnitude of
the pricing rule change, with less credible policies causing less changes in pricing policies.
They compute the eﬀect of a disin￿ation that is carried out without reneging, for various
degrees of credibility, but they do not evaluate average results, as we do here.
5The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present
the basic setting. Section 3 solves for optimal pricing rules under imperfectly credible
disin￿ation and presents a methodology for aggregating individual pricing rules out of the
steady-state. Section 4 reports the aggregate eﬀects obtained in our simulations and the
last section concludes.
2 The Model
We build on the static model results of Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987), and Ball and
Romer (1989). Starting from the speci￿cation of preferences, endowments and technology,
these models derive individual optimal price equations at each moment as a function of
aggregate demand (Ball and Romer) or directly as a function of the money supply and
price level (Blanchard and Kiyotaki). In order to generate individual uncertainty about
the optimal individual price, we add an idiosyncratic shock process to the optimal price
equation obtained in those models. These shocks are permanent and thus, together with
the money supply process and adjustment/information costs, generate intertemporal links
which make the model dynamic5.
Our economy is populated by an in￿nite collection of identical (in all aspects other than
the timing of adjustments and realization of idiosyncratic shocks) imperfectly competitive
5Having a dynamic macro model with intertemporal consumption and investment decisions would
complicate the model without aﬀecting the main insights.
6￿rms indexed in the interval [0,1]. We assume that the optimal level of the individual
relative price, in the absence of frictions, is given by:
p
∗
i − p = θy + ei (1)
where p∗
i is the individual frictionless optimal price, p is the average level of prices,
y is aggregate demand and ei is an idiosyncratic shock to the optimal price level (all
variables are in log)6.W ea s s u m et h a tf o re a c hi, ei f o l l o w sad r i f t l e s sB r o w n i a nm o t i o n
with coeﬃcient of diﬀusion σ and that those individual processes e0
is are independent of
each other. Since ￿rms are identical (although they can have diﬀerent prices and supply





where xi(t) is the price charged by the ￿rm i at time t.
Nominal aggregate demand is given by the quantity of money:
y + p = m
Substituting the above equation into equation (1) yields7:
6Equation 1 states that the relative optimal price depends on aggregate demand and on shocks speci￿c
to the ￿rm. It can be derived from utility maximization in a yeoman farmer economy, as in Ball and
Romer (1989).
7This equation can also be derived directly from other speci￿cations, such as Blanchard and Kiyotaki
7p
∗
i = θm +( 1− θ)p + ei (2)
If there were no costs to adjust prices and/or obtain information about the frictionless
optimal price level, each ￿rm would choose xi(t)=p∗
i(t) and the resulting aggregate price
level would be p(t)=m(t). Thus aggregate output and individual prices would be given
by y(t)=0and xi(t)=m(t)+ei(t), respectively.
We assume that the ￿rm can neither observe the stochastic components of p∗
i nor
a d j u s ti t sp r i c eb a s e do nt h ek n o w nc o m p o n e n t so fp∗
i without paying a lump-sum cost
F. On the other hand, to let the price drift away from the optimal entails expected pro￿t
losses, which ￿ow at rate Et0(xi(t) − p∗
i(t))2,w h e r et0 is the last time of observation and
adjustment and Et0 is the expectation conditioned on the information available at that
time8. Time is discounted at a constant rate ρ.
Given the stochastic process for the optimal price, each price setter solves for the
optimal pricing rule. The cost function after paying the adjustment/information gathering
cost at a certain time t0, can be written in the following way:










−ρs (xi(tj) − p
∗
i(tj + s))
2 ds + F
‚
(3)
(1987), where real balances enter the utility function.
8Observe that this form corresponds to a second order Taylor approximation to the expected pro￿t
l o s sf o rh a v i n gap r i c ed i ﬀerent from the optimal one whenever the second derivative of the pro￿t function
is constant.
8where tj is a time of adjustment/information gathering and xi(tj) is the price chosen
at time tj.
In analyzing disin￿ations we start from an in￿ationary steady state characterized by
a constant rate of in￿ation. Let ￿ be the constant rate of money growth. The evolution
of the frictionless optimal level in steady state will be given by the following equation:
dp
∗
i = ￿dt + σdwi (4)
In this case, it can be shown that the optimal adjustment interval τ∗ is de￿ned im-




































Based on the above equation, one can demonstrate that the optimal contract length
is decreasing in |￿| and σ,i n c r e a s i n gi nF and is not aﬀected by the degree of strategic
complementarity, 1 − θ9.
In our simulations, we set σ =3 %and calibrate F in such a way that with ￿ =3 % ,
σ =3 %and ρ =2 .5% ay e a r ,a￿rm chooses to collect information and adjust its price once
a year. As a result we set F =0 .000595.T h i sf r e q u e n c yo fa d j u s t m e n t si sc o n s i s t e n tw i t h
9This is because it only aﬀects the level of variables p(t) and p∗
i(t), but not their growth rates. This
ceases to be true out of the steady state.
9the ￿ndings of Carlton (1986) and Blinder et al. (1998) that in the American economy the
median ￿rm adjusts its price approximately once a year. This con￿guration of parameters
also generates plausible adjustment intervals for high in￿ation environments10.
3 Optimal Pricing Rules under Imperfectly Credible
Disinﬂation and Aggregation
In this section we derive optimal pricing rules during disin￿ation. In general this requires
solving both an optimization and an aggregation problem simultaneously. This is because
the optimal rule depends on the expected path for the aggregate price level and the path
for the aggregate price results from the aggregation of the individual pricing rules. In the
absence of strategic complementarities (θ =1 ) these problems can be solved separately.
We simplify the analysis by assuming away strategic complementarities, which allows
us to solve the problem sequentially.
Ad i s i n ￿a t i o np a t hf o rm(t) is announced at t =0 . Although the quantitative equa-
tion. does not take into account explicitly the eﬀect of in￿ation reduction, one can in-
terpret the variable m as the nominal aggregate demand, and assume that the Monetary
Authorities set the trajectory of the money supply that corresponds to our path for nomi-
nal aggregate demand11. Under this interpretation, for example if the variable m is halted,
10See Bonomo and Carvalho (2003).
11This strategy for modelling monetary disin￿ations is also followed by Mankiw and Reis (2002).
10money supply is increased by an amount just enough to satisfy the higher money demand
due to lower in￿ation expectations and maintain the nominal aggregate demand constant.
The problem of a ￿rm adjusting at t>0 can be characterized by the following Bellman
equation:






−ρ(s−t) [xi(t) − p
∗
i(s)]
2 ds + e
−ρτ(t)F + e
−ρτ(t)V (t + τ (t))
#















2 − ρF − ρV (t + τ (t)) + V
0 (t + τ (t))
“
=0 (8)
The problem above can be solved recursively, assuming that after a long time the
economy will reach a new steady state. Thus, for t large enough, V (t)=V￿0,w h e r eV￿0 is
the value function for the new steady state (money growth rate ￿0).
This formulation encompasses imperfect credibility in general, which enters the prob-
lem through the expectations operator. Economic agents in general do not fully believe
that a change in the monetary policy will last forever. It is not true, either, that they
are absolutely sure the new policy will be abandoned immediately. We therefore model
imperfect credibility as a conjecture that in each ￿nite time interval there is a positive
11probability that the monetary authorities will renege. For simplicity, we assume that the
probability of reneging at the next time interval is always the same. Thus, we model the
rate of growth of the money supply after stabilization as a Poisson process with constant
arrival rate h12. Once the new policy is abandoned, the agents believe that the old policy
will be kept forever13.
Speci￿cally, after the stabilization policy is launched, the process for the money supply
is given by:
dm =( 0+￿1{Nt≥1})dt
where N is a Poisson counting process with constant arrival rate h,a n d1{.} is the
indicator function. Then, the drift of the money supply will change from zero to ￿ when
an arrival occurs.
The parameter h can be interpreted as a measure of credibility. The extreme cases of
perfect and no credibility are associated with zero and in￿nity values for h, respectively.
Imperfect credibility is represented by strictly positive ￿nite values, and the higher is h,
the lower the degree of credibility. Observe that the probability the monetary authorities
will not renege until T periods after the stabilization is given by e−hT.T h u s ,i fh =0 .5,
the probability that the stabilization will continue after one year is 61%.
12T h i si st h es a m ea p p r o a c ha si nB a l l( 1995) and Almeida and Bonomo (2002).
13For simplicity, we specify a constant money supply growth rate after the stabilization ￿aw. To choose
this in￿ation rate to be the same as the pre-stabilization level is appealing, if one believes that certain
structural features of the economy determine money supply growth.
12In this case the problem of a ￿rm while the stabilization has not been reneged on may
be written as:






















0 [xi (t) − ei(t + s)]2e−ρsds+
Et
R τ






where V￿ is the cost function for the in￿ationary steady state problem. The ￿rst line of
the expression refers to the probability that the stabilization will be kept during the next
contract multiplied by the cost in this case. The second line is the cost if abandonment
occurs at time t + r (between curly brackets) weighted by the likelihood that it would
occur at that time. Observe that if abandonment occurs at a time before the subsequent
contract, the same will be reset under conditions identical to the in￿ationary steady state.
This results in the cost function V￿
14.














−ρsds + ei (t) (10)
14One implicit assumption here is that ￿rms do not reevaluate their contracts before planned. This
assumption is relaxed in Bonomo and Carvalho (2003), who conclude that the changes in the results can
be important for high but not for low in￿ation environments. We conjecture that a similar conclusion
obtains under imperfect credibility, for the same reasons outlined in that paper.
13Et [xi(t) − ei (t + τ)]
2 + he
















From 10, 11 and 9 we obtain a nonlinear equation in τ, which can be solved numerically.
Figure 1 shows the contract length function for diﬀerent credibility levels. The case
h =0corresponds to perfect credibility, while h = ∞ corresponds to the case where
stabilization is abandoned immediately with probability one. As expected, the higher h
is (the lower the credibility level), the smaller the increase in contract length is.
In the next subsection we explain brie￿y the methodology for aggregation of endoge-
nous time-dependent rules out of steady-states.
3.1 Aggregation Methodology
With endogenous rules in a changing environment, the contract length changes through
time. As a consequence, the distribution of price adjustments will be changing accordingly,
and aggregation requires monitoring the evolution of this distribution. For simplicity,
we assume that the initial (steady-state) distribution is uniform, which is the invariant
distribution in the in￿ationary steady state. However, the methodology could be applied
to any initial distribution.
Let g(.) be the function of time which gives the next adjustment time. Then g(t)=
t + τ(t). During credible disin￿ations g(.) tends to be nondecreasing, since ￿rms tend to
14choose longer contract lengths 15. In the case of imperfect credibility, g(.) decreases at
the moment the disin￿ation policy is abandoned.
In order to calculate the price level at a time after the announcement, we use the
function g(.) to relate the measure of ￿rms which set their actual prices at a speci￿ct i m e
u to the measure of ￿rms at times before u that would have their next adjustment at u
(those times are g−1(u)).L e tZ(t) be the correspondence that assigns to t the set of times
when the current prices were last adjusted. Formally:
Z(t)={s : s ≤ t and g(s) >t }
Let g−1(S) be the inverse image of the set S under g. Then, g−1(Z(t)) is the set
of adjustment times for which the next adjustment would be in Z(t).T o e v a l u a t e t h e
average price at t we need to know the probability measure v of the ￿rms which adjust at
subsets of Z(t). We can easily relate this measure to the measure ϕ in subsets g−1(Z(t)),








We apply the above formula recursively by relating distributions and adjustment time
sets during disin￿ation to distributions and sets at preceding times. We proceed this way
until we arrive at a set g−n(Z(t)) such that the measure of ￿rms adjusting at the subset of
times of this set corresponds to the uniform distribution of the in￿ationary steady state.
15See Bonomo and Carvalho (2003).
15Since we assumed away strategic complementarities, we ￿rst obtain the g() function
from the optimal pricing rules presented in the previous section and then aggregate indi-
vidual prices as described above.
4R e s u l t s
In Figure 2 we present the output eﬀects of a disin￿ation which is maintained forever,
for diﬀerent degrees of credibility. As expected, the lower the degree of credibility, the
larger the recession generated. It is clear that endogeneity of pricing rules reinforces
this result. This happens because contract lengths are increased after disin￿ation. For
h =0 , this corresponds to the perfect credibility result of Bonomo and Carvalho (2003).
In this case, as noticed in that paper, if in￿ation is reduced to zero and there are no
strategic complementarities, the output costs of disin￿ation are the same with endogenous
or exogenous rules. The reason is that every ￿rm which adjusts after disin￿ation is
announced knows that the aggregate component of their optimal price will be constant.
Then the length of the contract will not matter for the non-idiosyncratic part of their price.
With imperfect credibility this result is not true anymore, since there is some probability
that the central bank will abandon the stabilization before the next adjustment time, in
which case in￿ation will return. If the price is ￿xed for a longer interval, the probability
is higher. Therefore prices are set at higher levels and the recession is larger.
However, one may argue that this case corresponds to an event of zero probability in
16the prior assessment of ￿rms. A more complete analysis has to take into consideration
what happens during trajectories where stabilization is reneged. In this case, the output
path will depend on the moment of abandonment. There is a recession before stabilization
is abandoned that turns into a boom just afterwards. Before stabilization is abandoned,
￿rms set prices higher than in the case of perfect credibility because they attribute some
probability that the monetary authorities will renege before their next price adjustment.
This generates a larger recession than in the case of perfect credibility. When stabilization
is abandoned the money stock starts growing and so does output, since some past prices
were set attributing a positive probability that the stabilization would be maintained.
This is a reverse hangover eﬀect. Thus, if stabilization is abandoned right after the
announcement, both the recession and the boom are small, since the hangover eﬀect is
active for little time and the reverse hangover eﬀect has little time to build up. More
sizable recessions and booms happen when stabilization lasts longer. This is illustrated
in Figure 3.
Note that there are periods in which no price adjustments take place, due to the change
in contract lengths. These will be compensated by periods in which a larger measure of
￿rms adjust. This change in the distribution of adjustment times generates aggregate
cycles which are not present in the case of invariant rules.
O n ep o s s i b l ew a yo fs u m m a r i z i n gt h i se ﬀects is by averaging each individual path
according to its likelihood. Figure 4 shows the average output path for both invariant
17and endogenous rules for a given level of credibility (h =0 .5). The recession is more
severe when rules are endogenous. Because the contract length gets longer, the possibility
of abandonment leads to price setting at higher levels when compared to the exogenous
rules case. In the case of endogenous rules, we can also notice that after some time output
oscillates between boom and recession. This is because for some realizations of the Poisson
counting process, there will be holes in the distribution of adjustment times. Averaging
across all realizations yields the results depicted.
Figure 5 depicts the average output path for various degrees of credibility. The eﬀect
is non-monotonic in the degree of credibility. The recession increases when the degree
of credibility increases, starting from zero, decreasing after some point. At the extreme
case of no credibility (h = ∞) there is no recession, since the stabilization is abandoned
instantaneously and the in￿ationary steady state is maintained.
One could also imagine a situation in which a monetary authority that is really serious
about disin￿ation (h =0 )f a c e s￿rms which have prior beliefs about the "true type" of the
monetary authority (summarized by a common prior over h) and choose optimal pricing
rules accordingly. As stabilization is maintained, agents update their beliefs about the
type of monetary authority they face and this should attenuate the recession trough time.
Suppose, for example, that the ￿rms￿ priors attribute a high likelihood that h =0 .5.
Then, initially the recession should be like the one caused when the monetary authority
continues to disin￿ate despite having low credibility, on the h =0 .5 curve depicted in
18Figure 2. As time passes, credibility builds gradually and thus output should approach
the path represented by the h =0case in Figure 2.
5C o n c l u s i o n
One of the main methodological weaknesses in the literature which relates nominal rigidi-
ties and costs of disin￿ation is that pricing rules are invariant to policy regimes. This
paper evaluates the eﬀect of imperfect credibility of the disin￿ation announcement on the
output costs it generates in a model with endogenous time-dependent pricing rules. We
rationalized ￿xed price time-dependent rules as optimal rules, presented the solution for
the optimal rule in the case of an imperfectly credible disin￿ation and used a suitable
methodology for aggregating pricing rules under non-steady state conditions.
The results show that the endogeneity of rules matters for the assessment of the role
of credibility in disin￿ation processes. We ￿nd that these features interact to generate
an additional eﬀect on top of the ones obtained with either endogenous time-dependent
rules (Bonomo and Carvalho, 2003) or imperfect credibility (Ball, 1995) in isolation. This
results in higher output costs of monetary disin￿ation.
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23Output Realizations - No Abandonment














































































































































































































































































































Average effect, endogenous rules
Average effect, invariant rules
Figure 4:
26Different Credibility Levels
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